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slot these couplee are 
x ~ n  i& their m~tiozx+ib 
I ~mxnon.+ of commitment b , 
Just at the point that I fhishd this article, ' 
Congress acted to limit the effects that kgal 
mimiage would have, if Hawaii or any other 
a t e  moved to pennit same-sex couples to 
many. The new '''Def- of M g e  Act" 
declares that all federal statutes and 
regulations that refer to mimed persons or 
to spouses shall be read as applying to 
oppositeex couples cmly This article 
persists in reviewing both federal and state 
laws that bear on d e d  pawns, for the 
purpose of my exendse of imagination - 
the "what if? - is to ask how opposite-sex 
married p e m  are treated yncier the law 
today and hold these laws up to the 
situations of lesbian and gay male coupla. 
I. Postures towanl marriage 
A large proportion of American adults 
who identdy themselves as lesbian or gay I 
live with another pemn of the same sex and ' 
regard that person as their life partner. 
Exactly how many gay or lesbian adult& . 
, 1 ,  
there are in the United States and what 
proportion live with another in a long-term 
relationshp are not possible to calculate on 
the basis of exhting information. Still, every 
nwey of adult Americans willing to iden* 
hemselves as lesbian or gay hds  that a , 
majoIity or a near majority are living 
currently with a partner. Tncxtashg numbexs 
of these couples are celebrating their 
relationships in cezernonies of commitment. 
Those who pimiupate c o d y  refer to the , 
. . - - - .  cgrawks p weddings and to t$ym&v%d 
I . . ,  -, : .f ' C  ... . ' 
. - - .  ,;.: ;$- * .A;.%- -,:.,.: : r-5 < 8. ,., ! s ;. 5 .y,: . '+>:-a; .- - 
. . - .-.-d ,,, - .;  . , , :; . 2,z,.. ?$.,:!. 
as mmkd, wen though they h o w  hat &e 
cemo*a-~eo-by* 
laws of any sate, if state a t a d  the I@ $ 
right ta is highly phble,h$~ ~ u g $  
nltmhn of gay ilnd l&bM ages w&&I 2i 
chase ta putidpate. In a recent sum@, d #-  
qearly 2m bb@, for 
+ent said they would 
Exaay what lesbians wd gay nn_. hw 
to obtain from legal marriage i,s u n e i  
Since public ceremonies sf cornmitment~m 
already so aommon, one might expect 
when debating state-sanctimed.marriage 
they would Eom on what law itself can_ . , - 
accord that other Mh1ti0115 cannot: 
of legally protected benefits and 
imposed obligations. In fna, they do oa 
the vigofyws public chussian, few - . .' 
advocates address at my length thk 
&quenm of marliage. Wllllam 
for example, devotes only six of the 261 
pages in hjs h e  new book, ~ h e c ~ .  for ,,,:. 
samemesa m l g t ,  to the le& ~~YG?<?Z 
, . consecpmces, and his, with one ace* 
is the 1- discussion I can find. t'i- 
Whatever the context of the debate, 'most 
speaks am t m d h d  by the symbolignsrf 
legal recognition. It is gs if the wdal '. : .i 
d&ace af the marriage oe- 
people h d y  conduct t o w  count br 
- 
I 
That the social meanlngs of slate 
lecogni~~on draw so much attention is 
nonetheless understandable In our country, 
as in most societies throughout the world, 
lnarnage IS the single most significant 
communal ceremony of belongng In a law- 
dienched country such as ours, pem~isslon 
fol same-sex couples to many under the law 
would s~gnlfy the acceptance of lesblans and 
gay men as equal cltlzens more profoundly 
than any other nondiscnmina~ion laws that 
m~ght be adopted 
Skeptics about mamage wthin the 
lesblan and gay communities also largely 
ignore [he legal consequences of mamage 
They focus instead on the negative meanings 
they attach to the institution itself To many, 
mamage sign~fies hierarchy and dominance, 
subjugation and the graves of countless 
generations of marned couples, one stone 
reads "Herbert Smith," the other simply 
reads "Wife " And even ~f the legal institution 
of marnage has changed in lhe recent past, 
they reslst the assimilaton of queer couples 
into an oppressive heterosexual orthodoxy of 
ascnbed roles and domesllc~ty 
cp 
11. The legal consequences of marriage 
Each of the fifty states defines the 
incidents of marriage for its residents. 
Federa! laws add hundreds of other legal 
consequences. Some scholars have 
characterized the multitude of legal attributes 
of marriage today as largely incoherent, and 
in their details they surely are. Yet it is 
possible to identify lhree central categories of 
regulation, within each of whch a certain 
coherence obtains: some laws r e c o p e  
affective or emotional bonds that most 
people entering marriage express for each 
other; some build upon assumptions about 
mamage as creating an environment that is 
especially promising or appropriate for the 
raising of children; and some build on 
assun~ptions (or prescriptive views) about 
the economic arrangements that are likely 
to exist (or that ought to exist) between 
partners. 
As you read, you will encounter 
occasional ghosts from an authoritarian and 
foimally gendered past. The laws dealing 
with married persons have undergone a 
massive transformation during the last 
century Well into the nineteenth century all 
assets of a married couple, including those 
that the wife brought into a marrigae, were 
controlled by the husband. In fact, her 
personal property became his property The 
husband also, as a matter of law, controlled 
all decisions that related to a married 
couple's children. This male-controlled 
relationship was also dilficult or impossible 
to leave. At the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, maniage was indissoluble under the 
laws of nearly all states. Later in the century 
it was dissoluble, but only on proof by one 
sinless spouse of a serious marital sin 
committed by the other. 
Today, legislatures or judicial decisions 
have removed virtually all rules that 
explicilly provide different status or authority 
for husbands. They also permit marriage to 
end without proof of marital fault. The 
compulsory and sex-linked aspects of the 
law of mamage have, during the latter half of 
ths  century, been withering away, sometimes 
at the price of providing insufficient 
protection to women economically ill- 
positioned to protect themselves. As we will 
see, for example, the rules of divorce 
commonly treat mamage as a partnership 
with an equal division of property, but, 
because of their lower earnings, women are 
generally left sipficantly worse off 
financially than men are. Most gay and 
lesbian couples can, however, appropriately 
regard the legal aspects of marriage today as 
serving primarily, though not entirely, a 
facilitating function - offering couples 
opportunities to shape satisfying lives as 
formal equals and as they, rather than the 
state, see fit. 
A. Regulations that recognize emotional 
attachments 
Some laws and regulations dealing 
expressly with married persons can best be 
viewed today as promoting the emotional 
attachments that most spouses feel toward 
each other. Here are a few examples. Statutes 
or common law doctrine in all states grant 
decisionmalung powers to relatives when a 
person becomes incompetent to make 
decisions for herself. Two broadly different 
sorts of laws exist. The more narrow sort 
authorizes a family member to make an 
emergency medical decision when a person 
has become incompetent and has failed to 
execute a formal document authorizing some 
other person to make decisions on her 
behalf. When such incapacity arises for an 
unmarried person, state laws designate a 
parent or an offspring or some other blood 
relation as decisionmalier, but, for persons 
who are man-ied, they typically turn first to 
the person's spouse. The second sort of law, 
broader in scope, provides for tlze formal 
appointment of a "guardian" or 
"conservator," who typically makes not only 
medical decisions but other decisions about 
residence, care, and financial matters. These 
statues also differ widely, but corninonly 
provide first for the appointment of a blood 
relative for a single person and a spouse for a 
married person. The Uniform Probate Code, 
for example, has been adopted in fourteen 
states, and establishes an order or preference 
for the appointment of relatives as the 
guardian for an incapacitated person, wlth 
the spouse first in line, followed by an adult 
clzild or a parent. Upon death, other laws or 
court decisions provide that [he spouse has 
first right as "next of W to claim a person's 
remains and to malie anatomical gfts of 
parts of the deceased person's body when the 
deceased person has made no directive of 
her own. 
In a similar manner, state laws designate 
the spouse as the person to receive part or all 
of a married person's assets when he or she 
dies without a will. These "intestacy" laws 
vary widely among the states. In some states, 
if there are surviving children, a spouse 
receives as little as a thrd; 11-1 many others, 
a fixed dollar amount and a share of the 
remainder; in still others, the entire estate. 
In most states, if there are no sunriving 
chldren and no suniving parents, the 
spouse receives eveqhng .  
The laws relating to incompetency and 
death senre fairly obvious functions but ones 
worth explicit recognition. Some relate to the 
control of property, a subject talien up later. 
But most fundamentally, for couples who see 
themselves in an enduring relationship, the 
spouse is the appropriate person for dze state 
to designate as decisionmaker during a 
period of incompetency and as primary 
beneficiary after death on the basis of a 
reasonable guess that that is the person 
whom the now-incompetent or deceased 
person would have chosen if she had 
addressed the question in advance. That is, 
the rule fulfills her probable wishes. 
Do gay men and lesbians with partners 
need the protection of such laws to ensure 
that their partners make decisions for them 
or lnherit their estates? A veiy few states 
designate a long-term unmarried partner as 
the preferred decisionmaker for the 
incompetent person, but most states ignore 
the umanied partner altogether. Similarl~~, 
only a very few states provide that an 
unmarried partner shall refeive any portion 
of the estate of a person who dies without a 
will and, co date, no state provides an-g 
for a same-ses partner. Despite ths,  one 
could argue that gay couples do not need 
such protections because they can protect 
theinselves fully by simply executing a will 
or a medical power of attorney. But gay men 
and lesbians who are in relationships need 
these protections for the same reason that 
heter~se~xual persons need them. Like most 
heterosexuals, most gay men and lesbians are 
reluctant to h I k  about their mortality and 
procrastinate about remote contingencies. 
They fail to execute wdls and powers of 
attorney, even though they are often aware of 
the unfortunate consequences of failing to act. 
Even if all persons with a same-sex 
partner remembered to execute the proper 
documents and had access to the needed 
legal senices, other forms of government 
regulation that recognize special emotional 
and spiritual ties could not be similarly 
handled by a scheme of private designations. 
Consider four euamples. Federal law places 
severe restrictions on the opportunities for 
foreign-born nationals to immigrate legally to 
the United States. One significant exception 
to h s  rule of exclusion is that a foreign-born 
national who enters into a nonfraudulent 
marriage with an American citizen has a 
presumptive right to enter the United States 
immediately as a long-term resident. No 
such special provisions are made for a friend 
or lover. Even brothers or parents of a U.S. 
citizen are not automatically entitled to 
preferential treatment, but typically face long 
waiting periods before entry 
Another federal law, the Family and 
Medical leave Act of 1993, requires all 
employers with fifty or more employees to 
extend unpaid leave of up to twelve work 
weeks during each year to an eligble 
employee to care for a spouse with a "serious 
health condition." The statute also prowdes 
for leaves to care for children and for 
parents, but makes no provision of any kmd 
for fnends, lovers, or unmanied partners. 
The federal government and many states 
also ex~end an advantage to married people 
when called to testify in a criminal 
proceeding that bars the state from forcing a 
married person to testify against his or her 
spouse. Nearly all states offer a related 
protection, typically in both civil and 
criminal proceedings, for confidential 
communications made between spouses 
during the marriage. 
Finally, under the law of many states, if a 
thrd person injures a married person 
negligently and by so doing deprives the 
spouse of care and companionship, the 
spouse can typically sue the injuring party 
for what is called loss of "consortium," 
compensation not for financial loss but for 
the loss of companionship. 
The immigration   reference for spouses, 
the family leave provisions, the evidentiary 
mles, and the consortium mles have a 
common current justification: that it is fitting 
for the state to recogrue the significance in 
people's lives of one especially important 
person to whom they are not biologcally 
related. Lesbians and gay men in long-term 
relationships attribute a similar level of 
importance to their partners (even if they 
have other gay and lesbian friends they also 
consider significant). They need these rules 
as much as heterosexual people do. 
Gay men and women would experience 
as a burden, not as a benefit, a few 
regulations that attach to marriage and that 
also build, in substantial part, on 
assumptions about the emotional salience ol 
the marital relationship. Public and private 
employers, for euample, adopt antinepotism 
regulations that prohibit employees from 
participating in decisions to hre ,  promote, 
or discharge their spouse or from supervising 
their spouse in the workplace. Resting on 
views about both emotional and economic 
ties, these regulations are as justifiably 
imposed on lesbians and gay men in 
enduring relationships as they are on 
heterosexuals: no one can be expected to be 
sufficiently objective when decisions about 
one's own long-term partner must be made. 
B. Regulations dealing with parenting 
Gay male and lesbian couples raise 
chldren in this country in three common 
contexts. In the first, numerically the most 
common, one of the partners has already 
become the biologcal parent of a child 
(usually in the course of a prior relationship 
with a person of the opposite sex) and then 
has later formed a relationship with a same- 
sex partner. This new partner is functionally 
in the position of a "stepparent." In the 
second context, a same-sex couple, ajter 
beginnmg a relationshp, agree to raise a 
chld together. They plan that one of them 
\ d l  be the biologcal parent and that, after 
birth, they will serve as co-parents. In the 
third context, a same-sex couple seeks to 
adopt or to become the foster parents of a 
child who is biologcally related to neither 
of them. 
Opposite-sex couples also raise children 
in each of these sorts of contexts and, in 
each, laws and practices in all states treat 
such couples, when married, in specially 
favored ways. By contrast, in each of the 
three situations, a gay or lesbian partner who 
is not the biological parent of the child 
typically faces formidable, often insuperable, 
difficulties in becoming r e c o p e d  as a legal 
parent at all. The laws that advantage 
married couples are needed by some 
heterosexual married couples who wish to 
raise children, but these same laws would be 
helpful to almost all lesbian and gay male 
couples who wish to raise a child as legal 
equals because, for them, it is always the 
case that neither partner or only one is the 
biological parent of the child. 
In each context, most of the mles would 
be ddended today as intending to serve the 
best interests of children. I will focus on the 
value of these rules both for children and for 
lesbian and gay male adults who wish to 
raise children. As to the interests of children, 
a great deal has been written on the 
adequacy of gay men and lesbians as parents 
in the past two decades. I do not intend to 
review this literature. It is well reported 
elsewhere. In overwhelming measure, it 
concludes that a person's sexual orientation 
has no significant bearing on her or h s  
parenting capacities or skills and that 
children raised by lesbian and gay male 
parents fare as well day by day and over time 
as children raised by other parents. 
As we will see, some of the difficulties 
currently experienced by gay men and 
lesbians who wish to raise chldren are not 
formally imposed by law. Some arise under 
rules that courts and agencies already have 
the discretion to estend to gay people or to 
same-sex couples, but rarely do. Thus, in 
some contexts, the benefits of legal marriage 
for same-sex couples may lie less in the rules 
that would become applicable to them than 
in a changed attitude toward homosexual 
persons that a change in marriage laws might 
help bring about on the part of legal actors 
exercising authorities that already exist. Here 
the symbolic and the legal intertwine. 
1. The stepparent relationship 
When a lesbian or gay male parent with 
custody of a child begns to live with another 
person of the same sex, the new person 
assumes a parenting role functionally 
comparable to a stepparent. The state of the 
law about such parenting relationships 
outside of marriage is clear: no matter how 
long the gay "stepparent" lives with the 
chld, no matter how deeply she becomes 
involved in the care of the child, she and the 
child will rarely be recognized as having a 
legally significant relationship with one 
another. The state of the law is essentially the 
same for stepparent figures in opposite-sex 
unmarried couples. They are just the 
"boyfriend" or "girlfriend" or "live in" of the 
custodial parent and have no legal 
significance. 
Perhaps surprisingly, until the recent past, 
the legal position of the opposite-sex partner 
who marries a custodial parent has been 
little different. In all but a few states, the 
stepparent married to a biologcal parent has 
not been legally obliged to contribute to the 
support of the child during the marriage. In 
no state has the stepparent been required to 
contribute to the child's support upon 
divolce, no matter how long he lived wth  
the child or the extent of his voluntary 
contributions The stepparent has also had 
no legal entitlement upon divorce to be 
considered for court-ordered vlsitation or for 
sole or joint custody of the chlld It has been 
absent biologcal parent who remained 
financially liable for support, who remained 
the one parent el~gble for vlsitation (even ~f 
he never lived wth  the child), and who 
remalned second in line for custody 
Recently, however, stepparents marned to 
a custodial parent are coming to be 
iecognlzed as parent figures for at least some 
purposes, and i t  is to the benefits of these 
laws and court decisions that gay and lesblan 
stepparents" need access A few states have 
begun, for example, to protect the 
relationship between a child and a 
stepparent whose marnage to the biologcal 
parent comes to an end No state has 
imposed on the stepparent a general 
obligation of support upon divorce, but 
some courts and a few legslatures have 
given courts the authonty to grant vlsitation 
and, In unusual circumstances, custody, even 
over the objection of the biologcal parent 
States have also expanded the 
opportunities for stepparents dunng thelr 
marnage to a biologcal parent to become the 
full legal parent of a stepchild through 
adoption If the absent biologcal parent 
consents, most states permit the marned 
stepparent to adopt wthout any of the home 
vlsits and family studies usually required as a 
part of the adoption process Consensual 
stepparent adoptions now account for over 
half of all adoptions that occur in the Unlted 
States Within the last few decades, most 
states have recognized certain circumstances 
in which stepparents livlng wth  and marned 
to a biologcal parent are permitted to adopt 
even over the objection of the absent 
blologcal parent 
A further change regarding stepparents is 
found in laws relating to employment in the 
labor force State worker's compensation 
programs and the federal Social Secunty 
suimor benefit program pelmlt a minor 
stepchild livlng wtll and dependent upon a 
?repparent to receive benefits after the 
stepparent's death These programs replace 
much of the income lost to a child upon the 
aeath of the supporting stepparent Simlarly, 
the Federal Family and Medical Leave ACL of 
1993 requires employers to permlt a worlzer 
to talze up to twelve weeks of unpald leave 
to care for thelr seilously 111 chld, including 
a s~epchild 
Desplte these reforms that apply to 
slepparents marned to a biologcal parent, 
unmarned stepparent figures, of the same or 
opposite sex as the custodial parent, remain 
almost totally ignored by the law, wholl~7 
ineligble, for example, for the special 
treatment for stepparent adoption, wholly 
unable to secure for a child the benefits of 
workers' compensation or Social Security 
survivor benefits, and ineligible for the 
protections of the Federal Family and 
Medical Leave Act. They also remain free of 
the legal obligations that would come with 
adoption - most notably the obligation to 
provide financial support for the child they 
adopt. Extending these benefits and 
obligations to lesbians and gay men by 
permitting them to marry would serve well 
their needs and the needs of their chlldren 
for the same reasons that they serve the 
needs of mamed opposite-sex couples and 
their children: children who live with a 
stepparent figure who is in a committed 
relationship with their biologcal parent often 
become attached to and financially 
dependent upon the stepparent and these 
attachments warrant recoption. 
2. Artificial insemination, sperm donors 
and surrogacy 
The second parenting context for gay 
men and lesbians includes the same-sex 
couples, already formed, who agree that one 
of thein will become the biologcal parent of 
a child whom they will raise together. Here 
the issues are rather dfferent for women 
than for men. 
When a lesbian couple plan that one of 
them will become pregnant - and large 
numbers of lesbian couples seek to have 
babies today in this manner - they first 
must find a source of sperm. Some face 
problems that are not formal barriers of law 
but that are probably aWavated by the 
outlaw status of their relationship. Sperm 
banks in all states provide insemination 
services to women, most commonly in 
circumstances in which the woman is 
married and her husband is sterile. While no 
state expressly prohibits sperm banks from 
providing services to unmarried women or 
to lesbians, some doctors and sperm banks 
apparently decline to do so. 
Clearly legal problems arise after birth, at 
the point that the lesbian partner seeks to 
become recognized as a legal parent. She will 
be able to achieve such recognition only if 
she successiull~~ completes a formal process 
of adoption. In most states, her petition to 
adopt will be rejected, either because her 
partner and she are of the same sex, or 
because they are not mamed to one another, 
or both. In a growing number of states, the 
lesbian partner can be considered for 
adoption, but even in these states, the best 
aspects of marriage today as 
serving prima& though not 
entirely a facilitating 
function - offering couples 
opportunities to shape 
satisfying lives as formal equals 
and as they rather than the 
state, see f i t  
the couple can hope for is that, after 
completing elaborate forms and enduring an 
intrusive home study and an individualized 
inquiry into the chi ld  "best interests," a 
court eventually, many months after the 
child's birth, will approve the application of 
the nonbiological parent to adopt. The whole 
process is likely to cost thousands of dollars. 
Lesbian couples need a simpler and more 
welconling process. They need, at a 
minimum, the procedures available in most 
states to legally mamed couples in 
comparable circumstances. For such couples, 
most states' laws provide a straightforward 
procedure governing artificial inseminaton 
through clinics or sperm banks. The sterile 
husband simply acknowledges in writing his 
concurrence in his uifek insemination and 
h s  acceptance of the chld as his own. He is 
then treated for purposes of the la~v in 
exactly the manner that he would be if he 
had been the biological father. No home 
study is required. No court hearing is held. 
The child's birth certificate simply records 
h m  as the father of the child. Lesbian 
couples need access to the same automatic 
regstering of parenthood for the nonbio- 
logical female partner. 
Similarly problematic are the situations 
for gay male partners when they wish one of 
them to senre as the biologcal father for a 
child they plan to raise together. Ths  
situation is troublesome for it necessarily 
involves a much more substantial 
involvement by the other biologcal parent 
- the surrogate mother - than in the case 
of artificial insemination through a surrogate 
father, involvement under circumstances in 
which there are well-founded concerns for 
the intersts of the mother and of women 
in general. 
Reflecting differing resolutions of these 
concerns, state laws vary widely today 
regarding the legality and enforceability of 
sul-rogacy arrangements. Some prohbit 
surrogacy agreements altogether; some refuse 
to enforce them but do not prohibit the 
arrangements if voluntarily carried out; and 
some permit enforcement if the parties 
comply with various state-imposed 
requirements and if the mother does not 
change her mind ~v i t lm a statutorily 
prescribed period. Among the requirements 
in many states is that only married couples 
may enter into surrogacy arrangements with 
a donor mother. Thus, under these varymg 
schemes, few gay men could legally enter 
into an enforceable sun-ogacy agreement, 
and when they are able to do so, they would 
still have to overcome the adoption problems 
that lesbian couples face when both partners 
seek to be recognized as the legal parents of 
the cl~ild born to one of them. 
The issues surrounding surrogacy are 
complex, but, whatever their resolution, gay 
male couples need access to whatever 
scheme is made available to opposite-sex 
married couples. 
-.-- -.- -- ~ -
3. When neither partner is the biological 
parent: adoption and foster care 
Today, a few states prohbit lesbian and 
gay men from adopting under any 
circumstances and a few others prohibit 
them from serving as foster parents. Most 
other states make adoption or foster care 
very dimcult in practice for persons who are 
openly gay or lesbian. Single heterosexual 
individuals are also disfavored in practice 
almost everywhere. When single persons, 
gay or heterosexual, are permitted to adopt, 
they are often offered only the most hard-to- 
place children, children who are older and 
have had multiple foster placements, or 
chldren with multiple handicaps. 
By contrast, while procedures for 
adoption and foster care vary widely across 
the country it is the case everywhere that, 
whatever the procedure, the married 
heterosexual couple stands highest in the 
herarchy of preferred units for placement of 
a child. The status that is accorded to 
married opposite-sex couples today would 
provide fully adequate legal protection for 
the interests of gay male and lesbian couples 
and for the children they would raise. 
C. Laws regulating the economic 
relationship of couples or between the 
couple and the state 
A considerable majority of the laws that 
provide for differing treatment for married 
persons deal with the mamed couple as an 
economic unit. They build on beliefs or 
guesses about the economic relationships 
that married persons actually have and on 
prescriptive views about what those 
relationships ought to be. They assume that 
married persons differ from most single 
persons, including most single persons who 
share a residence with another person, in 
one or more of the following ways: the 
mamed partners will live more cheaply 
together than they would if they lived apart 
(that is, that there are routine economies of 
scale); the two will pool most or all of their 
current financial resources; the two will 
make decisions abou~ the expenditure of 
hese resources in a manner not solely 
determined by which party's labors produced 
the resource; the two will often engage in 
divisions ol labor for their mutual benefit; 
and one partner, typically the woman, will 
often become economically dependent on 
the other. 
To the extent that these laws have an 
empirical foundation, it is unclear whether 
the images of opposite-sex relationships that 
lie behind them will fit the circumstances ol 
the sorts of gay male and lesbian couples 
who would marry under a change in the law. 
What evidence there is suggests that most 
lesbian and gay couples in long-term 
relationships believe in pooling resources 
and practice it today, and that pooling is 
particularly common among those who 
engage in ceremonies of commitment. 
The review that follows divides the many 
financial regulatons that treat mamed 
persons differently than single persons into 
two rough sorts - those that fix the 
relationship between mamed persons and 
the state and those that fix the economic 
relationship between the two married 
persons themselves - because these sorts 




1. The regulation of the financial 
relationship between mamed persons 
and the state 
Tax laws and laws pertaining to 
government benefits commonly treat 
married persons in a distinctive manner by 
regarding them for most purposes as a single 
economic unit. 
Consider some examples. Federal and 
state income tax laws create a system of joint 
returns for married couples that treats the 
couples as a single economic entity Under 
these provisions, when only one spouse 
earns any income, the total tax liability for 
the couple will be less than it would be if the 
income-earning spouse filed as a single 
person, a result that may be tl~ought justified 
because two people are living on the single 
earner's income. On the other hand, when 
both spouses work and each earns even a 
fairly moderate income, their total tax 
liability will often be higher than it would 
have been if each had filed as a single 
person, a result that may again be thought 
justified because, by pooling incomes, they 
can live together more inexpensively than 
two single persons living separately In many 
situations, these two sets of iules produce 
wholly justifiable outcomes, but their 
paradoxical impact in practice is that many 
workmg men and women maximize their 
incomes by living together but not marrymg, 
each filing a separate return, even though 
thqmm-h-whenthendes 
attri!bAmm hame asma&bk than h e  
spmqma ~cj&rtably contiibute and em 
es h r n  marrying who 
~~~~W 
would by and l& couples be 
. d - d b y h t r e a t e d l i k e  
h e d  married couples across 
t h ; r m o f  s t a t e a n d u a l 1 4  
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to the same unfortunate behavioral 
incentives thd these rules create 
toddy Ior opposite-sex cc --?la. 
enduring ses-ascribed roles, the employnent 
of only one partner is likely to be the 
situation more often in opposite-sex than in 
same-sex couples. Moreover, the premise of 
the current rules is that mamed couples 
actually share in the control of resources and 
expenditures. When that premise fails, it is 
doubtful whether the burdens of the joint 
return should be imposed. Some observers 
have raised doubts about the actual degree of 
sharing of control in most heterosexual 
mamed couples, and it is quite possible that 
an e17en hgher proportion of gay men and 
lesbians who would many would be persons 
~ 7 h o  in their day-to-day lives would share 
only some of their income. 
On the other hand, remember that not all 
tax and welfare rules work to the harm of 
gay couples who would mag: In some 
couples, only one partner would work in the 
labor force, and for them the benefits of 
health coverage and the joint tax return 
might be substantial. In others, both partners 
would work, but only one with a job with 
medical benefits. For them, the value of tax- 
exempt benefits through the partner with 
coverage could be considerable. And for 
those at the hghest end of the income scale, 
the benefits of the estate and gft tax 
exemptions might more than offset the 
disadvantages of a joint return. 
Moreover, in actual practice, even for the 
couple in which both partners work and 
both earn significant incomes, the income 
tax and other rules may in actual practice 
less frequently cause behaviors experienced 
as painful by the parties. When neither 
partner in a couple considers hmself or 
herself the "secondary" worker - when 
both partners, that is, have strong ties to the 
labor force - then, while the perversities of 
the tax laws ma17 affect some decisions to 
marry, they are less likely to lead either 
partner to drop out of the labor force or feel 
economically useless in a manner that he or 
she resents or later comes to regret. And, 
viewed from another perspective, the 
opportunity for legal marriage, at the very 
least, provides a choice to opposite-sex 
couples whether to marry or not, a choice 
from which lesbian and gay couples could 
benefit for the same sorts of reasons. 
-A- . - -  
2. The regulation of the financial 
relationship between mamed partners 
In the United States today, states employ 
either of two broad schemes of regulation to 
define the economlc relatlonsh~p between 
mamed partners Nlne states (mostly in the 
West and Southwest) employ commumty 
property" regmes, under whlch, to 
oversimplify, the spouses own separately 
whatever they bling into the marriage or 
receive by gift or bequest duling the 
mamage and own jointly any other assets 
either of them acquires during the marriage, 
including all assets acquired from their 
labors. The earnings of each partner are 
owned jointly by the pair. In the remaining 
states, called "common law states," again to 
oversimplify, the spouses own separately 
whatever they acquire in their separate 
names and jointly whatever they buy in both 
names or whatever one by deliberate act puts 
into joint control. Their earnings are their 
own. These differences in law sound 
significant and may affect many married 
persons' perception of the nature of their 
relationship, but it is probable that social 
conventions linked to gender have greater 
impact than formal legal rules on the way 
that assets are controlled by married persons 
who live together. 
The mles of property do, however, 
become crucial at the point of divorce, for all 
states impose rules of distribution that have 
significant impact on the separate spouses' 
financial well-being. State divorce laws differ 
widely in their structures and in their details, 
but commonly produce similar outcomes. 
In community property states, each 
divorcing spouse is entitled to one-half of the 
property acquired during the marriage. In 
some states judges may deviate from this 
division in extraordinary circumstances. The 
remaining states have adopted more flexible 
schemes of property division generally called 
"equitable distribution." In these states, 
courts are permitted to ignore the rules of 
separate ownership and divide all property 
acquired during the marriage in an equitable 
manner. In practice in many equitable 
distribution states, lawyers for divorcing 
persons begn negotiations with an 
assumption of a division closely similar to 
the division imposed in community property 
states: in the absence of special 
circumstances, the couple d l  divide equally 
all assets acquired by either during the 
marriage. And in practice in many 
community property and equitable 
distribtuion states, the actual division of 
property negotiated by parties often deviates 
from a fifty-fifty distribution in ways that 
have little to do with formal legal mles. 
What is critical for our purposes is that at 
the point of divorce, under either regime, 
married persons encounter formal systems of 
forced allocation of assets that treat married 
persons as economic partners whlle they 
were together. Thus, as a single important 
esample, for many long-married couples 
today the largest single asset owned by either 
is a pension account accumulated in the 
name of one of them. In both community 
property and common law slates, that part of 
the pension assets attributable to the period 
of the mamage will be subject to division 
between the partners. 
State law also responds at divorce to 
imbalances in earning capacity between 
spouses, imbalances that have often been 
magnified during the "partnership." I t  does 
so in common law states by allowing judges 
to consider the disparate financial positions 
of the parties in the distribution of property 
Many states have also devised doctrines that 
permit courts to compensate a spouse in 
some manner for helping to increase the 
human capital of the ocher partner, most 
commonly by bearing the costs of putting 
the partner through professional school. In 
addition, both community property states 
and common law states permit courts to 
award periodic payments, called alimony or 
maintenance, for the support of a spouse 
unable adequately to provide for herself or 
himself after separation. Today alimony is 
awarded less frequently and for shorter 
durations than in the past. 
Death is another occasion when the law 
imposes financial obligations because of 
marriage. Under the laws of inearly all states, 
a married person cannot unilaterally prevent 
his spouse from inheriting part of his assets. 
Thus, when a mamed person dies with a 
will and the will fails to provide for the 
surviving spouse, the laws of nearly all 
common law states permit the suiviving 
spouse to claim a "forced or "elective" share 
of the estate, commonly one-third or one- 
half. Much the same result is reached in 
long-term marriages in community property 
states because, no matter what one spouse 
considers to be her separate property and 
attempts to bequeath by will to others, one- 
half of the assets acquired by the couple 
during the marriage will be considered the 
property of the other spouse at death. 
Thus at both divorce and death, states 
impose on married couples a prescriptive 
view of the appropriate financial relationship 
between them. Most states now permit 
couples, at the point of mamage or during 
the marriage, to contract for a different 
arrangement on death or divorce than the 
law would otherwise impose, though also 
placing some limits to ensure hat the 
decision to contract was "voluntary" and 
"informed." 
How, by comparison, does the law treat 
the income and assets of single persons with 
a long-term partner? Very differently indeed. 
In both community property and common 
law stam, the earnings of an unmarlied 
person aind the resources bought with those 
earnings are entirely the property of the 
earner. Moreover, in no state today does the 
state impose on the estate of an unmarried 
person a forced share for a surviving partner. 
An unmarried person can leave her money 
to whomever she pleases, no matter how 
long a relationship she may have had with a 
partner. 
The mles relating to the breakup of 
unmarried couples vary widely among the 
states. Until the last thirty years or so, courts 
in nearly all states refused to intervene at all, 
even when the parties had agreed to share 
assets, on the ground that the cohabiting 
relationship itself was immoral. A few states 
still retain this approach. In most states, 
however, the law has changed, responding to 
the huge growth in the numbers of 
unmanied opposite-sex couples living 
together and to the changed social 
perception of the acceptability of such 
cohabitation. Courts will enforce express 
agreements between unmarried persons to 
support each other or to divide property 
titled in the other's name. Some of the cases 
have involved same-sex couples. 
A few states have gone further than the 
enforcement of agreements, coming closer to 
imposing a marital regme. Some will enforce 
"implied con:racts," the contents of which 
courts infer not from words of agreement 
between the partners but from the partners' 
conduct - and which may in fact not reflect 
any actual agreement between the parties. In 
a few more states, judges will, at the request 
of a separating long-term unmarried partner, 
simply impose a property division that seems 
"just," even in the absence of any express or 
implied agreement between the parties, In 
inost states, however, unmarried partners 
still have no state-prescribed obligations to 
each other that apply in the absence of 
agreement. Each can walk away talung 
whatever is titled in his or her name. 
At first blush, the rules currently applied 
in inost states to the unmarried may seem to 
most gay men and lesbians preferable to the 
mles of forced sharing imposed on married 
people. Most states, as just described, impose 
on unmarried couples only what the couple 
itseIf has agreed to. Such a regme may well 
appeal to couples who are suspicious of the 
state and couples in which neither partner is 
economically dependent on the other. And, 
even if they saw themselves as having some 
continuing responsibilities, many would 
reject the notion of the state, through its 
judges, having the power to apportion fault 
or responsibility between them under the 
discretionary guidelines found in the 
"equitable distribution" states. 
Yet I think that the rules regarding the 
financial aspects of divorce now in place for 
married couples would serve lesbian and gay 
male couples reasonably well. In the first 
place, the property rules of divorce are gven 
life as part of a larger set of procedures 
governing divorce proceedings, procedures 
that encourage, or force, couples to wind up 
their financial relationshp prior to moving 
on to another relationship. In the second 
place, the rules regarding the division of 
property for married people are, to an 
increasing extent, subject to alteration by the 
agreement of the parties. Before or during 
mamage, the parties may contract for 
different outcomes between them that will be 
honored by courts if voluntarily entered. So 
seen, the rules of mamage operate as a 
default regme for couples who marry and 
do not choose a different scheme for 
themselves. 
Of course, just as only a small proportion 
of opposite-sex married couples enter 
agreements today to vary from the rules 
otherwise imposed at divorce, so it is 
probable that few gay male and lesbian 
couples would do so in the future. My own 
belief, however, is that a default rule of 
imposed sharing is preferable for gay male 
and lesbian couples to the default rule of 
separate property and no continuing 
obligations that now exlsts for unmarried 
couples. The moral claims for independence 
and separate ownershp have their own 
weaknesses. Some may look at the world of 
forced sharing and ahmony, remember a 
time when married women could own 
nothing in their own name, and wish to 
reject any reminders of the dependence of 
women on their husbands. But the world of 
independence has its own poisoned roots. 
Independence in law means that the person 
with legal title wins, and title, standing 
alone, bears little necessary relation to the 
efforts that lie behind the generation of the 
asset or to the moral implications of a long- 
shared life. 
Taken together, these considerations even 
support the claim that the default property 
rules for marriage d l  not merely serve most 
gay and lesbian couples reasonably well but 
will, in general, senre gay and lesbian 
couples who choose to many better than 
they senre opposite-sex married couples 
today Gay men and lesbians compelled on 
separation to share assets will be hurt less 
frequently when the law's promise of sharing 
fails to produce economic parity between the 
partners. Because the members of such 
couples are always of the same sex they more 
often earn similar incomes and are less likely 
to have gender-assigned expectations of 
divided responsibilities for income 
production during the relationship. 
111. Observations 
American states and the federal 
government, as we have seen, treat married 
individuals differently than single individuals 
in three broad respects - privileging their 
relationship to their spouse in certain 
contexts because of their affective ties, 
providing them and their partners 
opportunities for legally r e c o p e d  
parenting that are not provided to others, 
and extending benefits and imposing 
obligations based on a view of the partners 
as economically intertwined. 
Taken together, the rules bearing on 
marriage offer significant advantages to those 
to whom they apply The case I have tried to 
make for gay and lesbian couples is that they 
need these opportunities and choices to 
much the same degree that heterosexual 
couples do. 
Heterosexual conservatives object to 
same-sex marriage either on the ground that 
sex between persons of the same sex is 
immoral or pathologcal or on the ground 
that permitting same-sex couples to marry 
will somehow contribute to the crumbling of 
the "traditional" family Feminists among gay 
and lesbian scholars are also often critical of 
marriage for same-sex couples, fearing 
ddferent undesirable consequences for 
lesbian and queer communities. Neither 
objecting group focuses on the fit of specific 
legal rules with the lives of sane-sex couples 
and, for ths  reason, this article has not 
addressed their claims. Three other sorts of 
doubts that do address the legal 
consequences of mamage might nonetheless 
be raised about legal same-sex marriage, 
even by some gay men and lesbians who 
might be expected to be sympathetic. 
A first objection is that there is a better 
vehcle than somethng called "marriage" for 
extending the appropriate protections and 
opportunities to same-sex couples. Especially 
for those for whom mamage is indelibly 
associated with male-female relationships, 
the alternative of permitting same-sex (and 
opposite-sex couples who want it) to register 
with the state as "domestic partners" and 
extending to such partners some or all of the 
consequences attached to marriage may 
seem attractive. 
No American state has yet adopted 
domestic partner regstration, but, as we 
have seen, some states, through ima,@native 
court decisions and occasional statutes, are 
beginning to r e c o p e  unmarried couples 
for particular purposes. Formal regstration 
has been instituted in Denmark and Nomay, 
where registered same-sex partners are 
treated precisely like married couples with 
regard to all financial and economic 
regulations, but are not labelled as "mamed." 
LJnless a regme of domestic partnership 
were developed under which same-sex 
couples were treated just as opposite-sex 
mamed couples are, same-sex couples 
would probably find that domestic 
partnership legslation excluded benefits that 
they would much like to have. Thus, in 
Denmark, for example, registered same-sex 
couples are treated like opposite-sex mamed 
couples for purposes of economic benefits, 
but not for purposes of the adoption laws or 
any other laws that apply to parenting. 
I do not, however, wish to seem critical of 
the movement for domestic partnership 
registration. I believe that, though the rose 
by another name will not smell as meet to 
some of us. states are far more likely to 
accept domestic partnership than same-sex 
marriage. Denmark - and the fifty 
American states - may eventually accept for 
gay couples united under a name other than 
"marriage" all the special rules for married 
persons, including those that apply to 
parenting. And those of us who favor legal 
same-sex mamage must acknowledge that 
just as "domestic partnership" legslation 
might prokide only parts of the package of 
legal consequences that now attaches to 
mamage, so also legal "mamage" itseif might 
be granted piecemeal as well: a state might 
open legal mamage to same-sex couples but 
withhold parenting or other benefits from 
them, or, more fundamentally some states 
might extend all state laws bearing on 
maniage to same-sex couples while the 
federal government withheld the incidents of 
federal lacy 
A second doubt about pursuing changes 
in the laws of who may marry is that the 
benefits of mamage are likely to be unevenly 
distributed among same-sex couples. Nitya 
Duclos, a Canadian scholar, has argued, for 
example, that the rules of marriage would 
primarily benefit lesbians and gay men who 
are members of the idle class - "those who 
are already fairly high up in the hierarchy of 
privilege." She does not argue that this 
lopsided allocation of benefits is a reason not 
to permit same-sex marriage, for surely it is 
not, but rather is a reason to be less exultant 
about what will be achieved by it. 
Duclos may be right. Those high in the 
hierarchy of privilege usually come out 
ahead. Still, at least in this country, many 
lower-income same-sex couples will find 
great benefits in mamage. Duclos claims that 
"[tlhose who rely for most of their income 
on state benefits are more likely [than 
middle class persons] to be economically 
for manyng," and it is true that a 
~i~gnificant cost of mamage for some lower- 
income persons who marry a working 
person is the loss of government benefits, 
such as Medicaid or Supplemental Security 
Income. It is also tnle that some other rules, 
such as those exempting bequests to a 
spouse from the estate and gft tayes, are of 
value only to those who have large sums to 
give away Still, there may be compensating 
gains for low income persons. Social Secunty 
retirement benefits for a nonworhng spouse 
and Social Security sunivor benefits are of 
most importance to those without long ties 
to the formal economy Medical benefits tied 
to employment - including employment of 
some low-earning government employees - 
are of immense significance to spouses with 
jobs that carry no health coverage at all. And 
other benefits, such as the immigration rules 
or rules that relate to intestate succession, are 
likely to be at least as frequently invoked by 
the people of modest incomes as they are by 
the well-heeled. It is impossible for all sorts 
of reasons to make a confident prediction of 
what class-groups among gay men and 
lesbians would benefit most from being 
permitted to marry, but there is ample reason 
to believe that the rules relating to mamage 
will be appealing to many people of all 
classes. 
A final criticism of the laws bearing on 
mamed persons is more fundamental: even 
if legal marriage would offer benefits to a 
broad range of same-sex couples, some 
might claim that all these advantages are 
illegtimate - illegtimate for both same-sex 
and opposite-sex couples - because they 
favor persons in two-person units over single 
persons and over persons living in groups of 
three or more, and because they favor 
persons linked to one other person in a 
sexxal-romantic relationship over persons 
linked to another by friendship or other 
allegances. Those of us who are gay or 
lesbian must be especially sensitive to these 
claims. If the deeply entrenched paradigm 
we are challenging is the romantically linked 
man-woman couple, we should respect the 
similar claims made against the hegemony of 
the two-person unit and against the romantic 
foundations of marriage. 
Still, nearly all reform to correct disparate 
treatment in our society is incremental. It  
comes at points at which the state finally 
recognizes the legtimacy of the claims of 
some long disfavored group. Thus, within 
this century, governments have gradually 
changed their posture toward the legal 
position of the child born outside of 
marriage and toward unmarried opposite-szs 
couples in their relationships with one 
another. 
A next appropriate step is the step 
discussed in this article - the recognition of 
same-sex couples who wish to marry. And 
although it is conceivable, as some have 
feared, that permitting gay people to marry 
mill simply reinforce the enshnned position 
of married two-person units in general in 
our society, it seems at least as likely that the 
effect of permitting same-sex mamage will 
be to make society more receptive to the 
further evolution of the law. By ceasing to 
conceive of marriage as a partnership 
composed of one person of each sex, the 
state may become more receptive to units of 
three or more (all of which, of course, 
include at least two persons of the same sex) 
and to units composed of two people of the 
same sex but who are bound by friendship 
alone. All desirable changes in family law 
need not be made at once. 
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